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II.

A.

STA TEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.

In granting TitleOne Corporation's ("TitleOne") motion for summary judgment, the
district court correctly summarized Eagle Equity Fund, LLC's ("EEF") case, as "plaintiffs cast
much too broad a net, suing too many defendants on too many theories, armed with too few
supporting facts." R. at 3808. Now, on appeal, EEF rehashes the same inadequate arguments
that go unsupported by the record.
At the center of EEF's case is the allegation that TitleOne negligently reconveyed a deed
of trust in favor of EEF.

Using the reconveyance as a springboard, EEF launched a case

claiming widespread collusion between TitleOne and eight other named defendants who
allegedly conspired to deprive EEF of the value of its second position deed of trust. EEF's
pleadings argue that defendants conducted a series of fraudulent conveyances all as part of a plan
to intentionally interfere with EEF's right to security for payment on a promissory note. EEF's
theory, however, has no factual support.
More importantly, from the onset of the proceedings below, it was apparent that EEF's
second position deed of trust was so underwater that no cognizable proof of damage or loss to
EEF could be shown despite the allegedly negligent reconveyance.

Simply put, this case

involves whether EEF failed to show that the loss of its second position deed of trust in real
property caused EEF damage in light of the fact that the real property lacked even enough value
to pay the first position.
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The district court's judgment in favor of TitleOne should be affirmed because: (1) EEF
failed to offer cognizable proof of any damages, an essential element of its claims against
TitleOne; (2) EEF's LC. § 45-1205 claim is barred by the applicable three year statute of
limitations; (3) EEF's common law negligence claim is barred by the economic loss doctrine and
alternatively is precluded by the exclusive statutory remedy of LC. § 45-1205; and (4) EEF failed
to offer evidence on the essential elements of its tortiuous interference with a prospective
economic advantage claim.
This appeal can and should be resolved on EEF's failure to offer evidence of damages
with reasonable certainty. However, if the Court proceeds beyond the initial dispositive question
of damages, the same result is warranted because EEF failed to meet its burden on essential
elements of its claims against TitleOne.

B.

Course of Proceedings. 1
On June 5, 2013, EEF initiated this matter by filing its Complaint, which pied nine counts

against all defendants: (1) breach of contract; (2) bad faith; (3) negligence; (4) violations of the
Idaho Consumer Protection Act; (5) fraud and fraudulent conveyance; (6) collusion to defraud;
(7) conversion; (8) unjust enrichment; and (9) tortious interference with a prospective economic
advantage. R. at 21--68.
On September 6, 2013, TitleOne filed a motion to dismiss EEF's complaint and a
supporting memorandum. R. at 98-123. The district court issued its Memorandum Decision and
1

The procedural history of this case is complex and voluminous, primarily because of the high
number of claims EEF pled against numerous defendants. With this Respondent's Brief,
TitleOne will endeavor to recite to the Court only the germane procedural history.
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Order on Various Motions ("First Decision") addressing TitleOne's motion to dismiss on
December 2, 2013. R. at 526-67. As to TitleOne, the district court dismissed each count in the
Complaint except: (1) fraud and fraudulent conveyance; (2) unjust enrichment; and (3) tortious
interference with a .prospective
economic advanta2:e. R. at 526-67.
.
~

Prior to the district court's First Decision, EEF moved to amend its Complaint (R. at
204-12), which was granted.

R. at 554-60.

On December 10, 2013, EEF filed its First

Amended Complaint, which pied six causes of action against TitleOne: (1) fraud and fraudulent
conveyance; (2) collusion to defraud; (3) conversion; (4) tortious interference with a prospective
economic advantage; (5) breach of fiduciary duty; and (6) violation of LC. § 45-1205. R. at
568-86. On January 2, 2014, TitleOne filed a motion for summary judgment and supporting
memorandum with respect to the remaining live counts in the case. R. at 620-23, 628-52.
While TitleOne's motion for summary judgment was pending, EEF filed another motion
to amend its complaint and memorandum in support. R. at 877-85. Thereafter, on February 6,
2014, EEF filed its Second Amended Complaint (R. at 963-79) and shortly thereafter a Revised
Second Amended Complaint. R. at 980-97. The Revised Second Amended Complaint was
EEF' s final pleading and the operative complaint that was finally dismissed by the district court
in its Memorandum Decision on September 19, 2014. R. at 3052-64.

As to TitleOne, the

Revised Second Amended Complaint pleads five causes of action: (1) fraud and fraudulent
conveyance; (2) collusion to defraud; (3) tortious interference with a prospective economic
advantage; (4) breach of fiduciary duty; and (5) violation of LC.§ 45-1205. R. at 980-97.
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On February 26, 2014, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on
Various Motions ("Second Decision"). R. at 1054-81. The Second Decision dismissed EEF's
breach of fiduciary duty claim against TitleOne.

R. at 1072.

The Second Decision also

addressed EEF's claim under LC. § 45-1205 and held that the claim was time barred by I.C. § 5218(1)'s three-year limitations period but, instead of dismissing the claim outright, granted EEF
additional time to establish that equitable estoppel prevented TitleOne from raising the statute of
limitations as a defense. R. at 1063-66.
On July 1, 2014, TitleOne filed its second motion for summary judgment and
memorandum in support.

R. at 2364-66, 2388-2413.

Again, following TitleOne's second

motion for summary judgment, EEF motioned to amend its complaint (R. at 2741--45, 2746--48),
which was denied. R. at 3120-36. EEF filed a motion and memorandum asking the district
court to reconsider its decision that the three-year limitations period from LC. § 5-218(1) applied
to its cause of action under LC. § 45-1205, arguing instead that a twenty-year limitations period
applied from LC. § 5-204. R. at 2734--40.
On September 19, 2014, the district court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order
Granting Defendant TitleOne Corporation's Second Motion for Summary Judgment ("Order
Granting Summary Judgment"), wherein all remaining claims asserted by EEF against TitleOne
were dismissed. R. at 3052-64. 2 At this point in the case, the only pending claims against

2

The Order Granting Summary Judgment did not resolve all the claims pending against other
parties in the action. Accordingly, TitleOne filed a motion and memorandum seeking a Rule
54(b) certificate. R. at 3140-51. The district court addressed this motion in its Memorandum
Decision and Order, wherein, instead of issuing a Rule 54(b) certificate, the court severed EEF' s
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TitleOne were (1) tortious interference with prospective economic advantage and (2) violation of
I.C. § 45-1205. R. at 3052-53. 3 The Order Granting Summary Judgment dismissed both counts
for the same reason, EEF failed to offer competent evidence of damages. R. at 3061.
The Order Granting Summary Judgment denied as moot RFF' s motion to reconsider the
statute oflimitations issue because the I.C. § 45-1205 claim was dismissed due to EEF's failure
to establish damage, not based on the statute oflimitations had run. R. at 3062. On December 1,
2014, the district court issued a Judgment dismissing all of EEF's claims against TitleOne with
prejudice. R. at 3222-25.
Following the court's judgment, the parties engaged in extensive litigation over attorney
fees and costs, which culminated in the district court issuing its Memorandum Decision and
Order Awarding Costs and Attorney Fees and Imposing Rule 11 Sanctions. R. at 3807-41.
Therein, the district court concluded that defendants were prevailing parties and granted
TitleOne an award of costs in the amount of $2,878.69 and attorney fees in the amount of
$38,000 pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. R. at 3814, 3833. The district court sanctioned EEF's
counsel, Aaron Tribble and David M. Fogg, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 1l(a)(l) for making frivolous
filings and ordered each to pay $1,500 to the court. R. at 3836-39. On February 23, 2015, the

remaining debt collection claims against other defendants pursuant to I.R.C.P. 21 and assigned a
new case number designation to these claims, i.e., treating these as a separate action entirely. R.
at 3217-19. The court's severance of the pending claims from the resolved claims resulted in a
full adjudication of the original action, permitting it to proceed to judgment without a Rule 54(b)
certificate. R. at 3217.
3 EEF voluntarily conceded that summary judgment on its claims of fraud and collusion to
defraud was appropriate. R. at 3052-53.
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district court issued an Amended Judgment, reflecting the fee awards it granted defendants and
the sanctions imposed on Mr. Tribble and Mr. Fogg. R. at 3842-44.
On January 9, 2015, after the district court's entry of judgment on all claims, but prior to
a resolution on fees, EEF filed a notice of appeal designating seventeen isimes on appeal. R. at
3588-3609. On March 17, 2015, EEF submitted an Amended Notice of Appeal that severely
curtailed the issues on appeal. R. at 3856-81.

C.

Statement of Facts. 4
i.

The Development Loans and EEF's Agreement to Subordinate.

In 2006, Galiano, LLC ("Galiano"), was developing a 29.63 acre parcel of real property
in Kuna, Idaho (the "Property"). R. at 527. The plan was to subdivide and plat the Property into
sixty separate residential lots, which did occur.

R. at 1056.

To finance the development,

Galiano, through its managing member, Edward I. Mason, engaged two separate creditors. R. at
527, 1056.
First, on November 17, 2006, RBC Centura Bank ("RBC") loaned Galiano $6,063,300
under two separate promissory notes (collectively, the "RBC Loan"). R. at 1056. The RBC
Loan was secured by a deed of trust in the Property recorded as Instrument No. 106181858 in the
real property records of Ada County, Idaho on November 17, 2006 (the "RBC Deed of Trust").
R. at 1056. RBC was the beneficiary and Alliance Title & Escrow Corp. ("Alliance Title") was
the original trustee under the RBC Deed of Trust. R. at 1057.

4

As with the above procedural history, this statement of facts endeavors to only present to the
Court those facts relevant to the Court's determination of the issues raised on appeal by EEF.
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Second, and contemporaneously with the RBC Loan, Galiano executed a promissory note
in the amount of $725,500 in favor of EEF (the "EEF Loan"). R. at 1057. The EEF Loan was
secured by a deed of trust in the Property, which was recorded in the real property records of
Ada County, Idaho on November 17, 2006, as Instrument No. 106181859 (the "EEF Deed of
Trust"). R. at 1057. EEF was the beneficiary and Alliance Title Co. was the original trustee of
the EEF Deed of Trust. R. at 1057.
A Subordination Agreement between Galiano, RBC, and EEF expressly made the EEF
Loan and EEF Deed of Trust junior to the RBC Loan and Deed of Trust. R. at 1057. The EEF
Deed of Trust conspicuously reflected the subordination on its face stating: "*** THIS DEED
OF TRUST IS JUNIOR AND SUBORDINATE TO SAID DEED OF TRUST RECORDING
CONCURRENTLY HEREWITH***" R. at 283.
ii.

The Reconveyance of the EEF Deed of Trust.

On January 25, 2010, TitleOne received a Reconveyance of Deed of Trust from a thirdparty servicer, Post-Closing Department, Inc. ("PCD"). R. at 1057. At that time, PCD provided
recordation and other reconveyance services to TitleOne.

R. at 1057.

Upon receiving the

Reconveyance of Deed of Trust from PCD, TitleOne employees signed the reconveyance and
returned it to PDC who then recorded the reconveyance in the real property records of Ada
County on February 11, 2010 as Instrument No. 110012858 (the "Reconveyance"). R. 1057-58.
EEF claims it did not receive notice of the Reconveyance or satisfaction of the debt secured by
the EEF Deed of Trust, although there was testimony from PCD that it had sent notice 60 days
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before reconveyance occurred.

R. at 691, 1058, 1768 and 17695 .

EEF discovered the

Reconveyance in early March of 2013. R. at 3810.
iii.

Galiano's Default and Sale of the Property.

In 2011, Galiano become unable to make payments on the RBC Loan as they came due.
R. at 1058. On May 17, 2012, Galiano, by General Warranty Deed, sold the remainder of the
lots on the Property to DAS Investments, LLC ("DAS") for $860,000.

R. at 3810.

RBC

consented to the DAS sale despite the approximately $2.5 million deficiency. R. at 3810. On
November 1, 2012, RBC entered into a stipulated judgment with Galiano, Ted Mason Signature
Homes, Inc., and Edward and Sherry Mason in the principal amount of$2,601,541.37 plus costs,
fees and interest. R. at 1058. EEF was unaware of the sale to DAS and the settlement.

iv.

DAS' Sale of the Individual Lots.

Upon purchasing the Property in May of 2012, DAS began to sell off the individual lots
to Corey Barton Homes, Inc. ("CBH"). R. at 3810. Over the course of approximately one year,
each lot was sold to CBH.

R. at 3810.

EEF presented some evidence that DAS sold the

individual lots for a total of $1.13 million, allegedly resulting in a gross profit of approximately
$270,000 and a net profit in some lesser amount after taking into account transaction costs,
holding costs, and other expenses. R. at 3810.

III.
A.

5

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether this Court need address any other issue on appeal besides the absence of
cognizable proof of damage, when that issue is dispositive of all claims and was
the sole basis of the district court's ultimate decision on summary judgment.

See also Note 8, infra.
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B.

Whether LC. § 45-1205 is the exclusive remedy for "resulting damages" for
negligent reconveyance of a deed of trust under LC.§ 15-501, et seq.

C.

Whether EEF has waived, or is judicially estopped from asserting, that the district
court erred in dismissing its common law negligence claim.

D.

Whether TitleOne is entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to LC.
§§ 12-120(3) and/or 12-121.

IV.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(d)-(e) and LC. §§ 12-121 and 12-120(3), TitleOne hereby
requests its attorney fees and costs on appeal. TitleOne notes that pursuant to I.A.R. 41(a),
TitleOne has designated the award of attorney fees on appeal as an issue on appeal. Further,
pursuant to I.A.R. 35(b)(5), TitleOne will present its argument on the issue of appellate attorney
fees supported by citation to authorities, statutes, and the record in Section VI herein.

V.
A.

ARGUMENT

Standard of Review.
"This Court reviews a ruling on summary judgment under the same standard as the trial

court." Hayes v. City of Plummer, 159 Idaho 168, 357 P.3d 1276, 1278 (2015). "Summary
judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw."' Id. (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)).
Flimsy or transparent contentions, theoretical questions of fact which are not
genuine, or disputes as to matters of form do not create genuine issues which will
preclude summary judgment. Neither is a mere pleading allegation sufficient to
create a genuine issue as against affidavits and other evidentiary materials which
show the allegation to be false. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to
create an issue; there must be evidence on which a jury might rely.
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Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519, 524, 272 P.3d 491, 496 (2012)

( citation omitted). "Summary judgment is appropriate if the plaintiff fails to demonstrate the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to causation and damages." J-U-B Engineers,
Inc. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 146 Idaho 311, 317, 193 P .3d 858, 864 (2008) (quoting
McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 396, 64 P.3d 317, 322 (2003)).

"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that the Supreme Court reviews de
novo." Hayes, 159 Idaho 168, 357 P.3d 1276, 1278 (2015) (quoting State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho
863,865,264 P.3d 970,972 (2011)).
The Court's review of EEF's appeal potentially involves determining the applicable
statute of limitations. "The determination of the applicable statute of limitation is a question of
law over which this Court has free review." Hayden Lake Fire Prat. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho
388, 403, 111 P.3d 73, 88 (2005) (citing Oats v. Nissan Motor Corp. in the US.A., 126 Idaho
162, 164-72, 879 P.2d 1095, 1097-1105 (1994)). "The time when a cause of action accrues may
be a question of law or a question of fact, depending upon whether any disputed issues of
material fact exist." Nerco Minerals Co. v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 140 Idaho 144, 148, 90
P.3d 894, 898 (2004) (quotation omitted). It is a question oflaw where there is no dispute over a
material "fact regarding when the cause of action accrues" and it is a question fact where "there
is conflicting evidence as to when the cause of action accrued." Id.
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B.

The District Court Properly Dismissed EEF's I.C. § 45-1205 Claim because EEF
Failed to Offer Competent Evidence to Establish its Damages, if any, with
Reasonable Certainty.
Based on the language of I.C. § 45-1205, the district court determined that proof of

damages is an essential element of a claim under LC.§ 45-1205. R. at 3057. Idaho Code§ 451205 provides:
In the event that a trust deed is reconveyed by a title insurer or title agent

purporting to act under the provisions of this chapter, but the obligation secured
by the trust deed has not been fully paid, the title insurer or title agent effecting
such reconveyance shall be liable to the beneficiary of the trust deed for the
damages suffered as a result of such improper reconveyance only if the title
insurer or title agent failed to substantially comply with the provisions of section
45-1203 or 45-1204, Idaho Code, or acted with negligence or in bad faith in
reconveying the trust deed.
LC. § 45-1205 (emphasis added).
The district court concluded that because EEF failed to introduce competent evidence of
damages resulting from the Reconveyance, summary judgment was warranted. R. at 3061. In so
holding, the district court carefully analyzed each of EEF' s lackluster arguments that it suffered
damage. R. at 3057-61.
The starting point of the district court's analysis is that EEF was a second position
creditor secured by property with insufficient value to satisfy the first position creditor's loan. R.
at 3058. The district court concluded that TitleOne, by advancing argument and authority that
EEF's junior lien was worthless, "met its burden to show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact as to damages" thereby shifting the burden to EEF to provide evidence of damage.
R. at 3058. However, the court held that "EEF wholly fail[ ed] to meet its burden." R. at 3059.
The court stated:
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Without proof that the property's value ... exceeded the amount owning to RBC,
there is no proof that EEF' s deed of trust was worth anything at any material time.
A party whose deed of trust is worthless is, for practical purposes, no worse off
when the deed of trust is reconveyed.
R. at 3059.
Despite failing to offer sufficient evidence of the Property's value to demonstrate that
EEF's second position deed of trust had any value, EEF argued below that "had it known about
the short sale, it might have negotiated to purchase the property itself." R. at 3060. The district
court found that EEF's representation that it "might" have purchased the property insufficient to
establish any damages. This was because EEF offered no evidence of the price the Property
would have commanded or that the value of the Property if purchased would have been greater
than the hypothetical purchase price. R. at 3060. Ultimately, the court stated: "EEF does not
show damages by simply presuming that, in the absence of the apparently wrongful
reconveyance, it would have bought the property instead of DAS and resold it to Corey Barton
Homes for a profit, just as DAS did." R. at 3060.
EEF now argues that the district court erred in concluding that it failed to present
sufficient evidence of damages to survive TitleOne's motion for summary judgment. Appellant's
Br. at 8. EEF raises the same "missed opportunity" argument that the district court rejected
below. Specifically, EEF argues that it was damaged by the Reconveyance because it resulted in
EEF not receiving notice of the sale of the Property to DAS, which resulted in "the loss of
opportunity to participate" in the sale of the Property. Id. at 10. This missed opportunity, EEF
argues, can be quantified based on the $270,000 gross profit that DAS allegedly realized from
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the sale of the individual lots to CBH. Id. at 11. As the district court properly concluded, this
argument is nothing more that speculation. Accordingly, EEF's argument lacks merit because
the loss of the opportunity to participate alone is not damage. EEF cannot prove what could have
or would have happened had it participated. Why, for instance, would it have spent more money
on property that would not sustain its worth? Why, to put it in the vernacular, "throw good
money after bad"?

EEF has not demonstrated competent evidence of its damages with

reasonable certainty. Indeed, EEF as much as admitted that its damages were speculative:
Judge Scott: Do you intend to come forward with anything that would be relevant
to the subject of damages?
MR. TRIBBLE: At this point, Your Honor, the best thing that we've been able to
figure out is that there is no answer, and there's really no way to calculate what
this property would have been worth. And I think there was an enough turmoil in
the market, and from people that we've talked to, it's really impossible to say one
way or the other. And maybe there's an answer there in and of itself, but it's
almost the same thing as asking an expert, is asking them to speculate about - I
mean, they literally would have to speculate to try to draw a number.

MR. TRIBBLE: Now, the appraisal, we did contact a very reputable broker in the
area and asked him to see what he could do with getting an appraisal. And the
answer that we got back was is he has no way of knowing. There just simply
aren't comps available. He said he could try to make guesses, but it would just be
pure guesswork, and it would be literally just a stab in the dark is what we got.
Tr. at 306 and 435.
It is elemental that "[a] person asserting a claim of damages has the burden of proving not
only a right to damages, but also the amount of damages." Beare v. Stowe's Builders Supply,
Inc., 104 Idaho 317,321,658 P.2d 988, 992 (Ct. App. 1983) (citations omitted).
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Evidence of damages "is sufficient if it proves the damages with reasonable certainty."

Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., 146 Idaho 613, 618, 200 P.3d 1162, 1167 (2009) (citation
omitted). "Reasonable certainty requires neither absolute assurance nor mathematical exactitude;
rather, the evidence need only be sufficient to remove the existence ofdamages from the realm of

speculation." Id. (emphasis added). See also Pope v. Intermountain Gas, 103 Idaho 217, 234,
646 P.2d 988, 1005 (1982) ("[T]he factfinder may not determine damages by mere speculation
and guesswork, and there must be a reasonable foundation established by the evidence from
which the factfinder can calculate the amount of damages."); Trilogy Network Sys., Inc. v.

Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 847, 172 P.3d 1119, 1122 (2007) (holding that "conclusory statements"
of lost profits, without proof, are not sufficient to establish damages).
Here, the district court properly stated that "it is up to EEF to demonstrate that the junior
deed of trust has real value that was lost as a result of the reconveyance" and that "EEF simply
failed to do so." R. at 3059. Simply stated, EEF failed to offer evidence to establish its alleged
damages with reasonable certainly.
The district court's holding as to damages stemming from a reconveyance is consistent
with reported decisions from elsewhere in the country. In cases involving the loss of a security
interest, like the instant case, the measure of damage is the fair market value of the real property

as of the date of conversion less prior liens and taxes but no more than the amount due on the
note. See Stephans v. Herman, 225 Cal. App.2d 671, 73-74 (Cal. D. Ct. App. 1964) (emphasis
added) (applying foregoing formula where title company's negligence resulted in the wrongfully
reconveyance of a deed of trust); Howe v. City Title Ins. Co., 255 Cal. App.2d 85, 87 (1967)
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(rejecting argument that face value of note fixed the amount of damages in a case where title
company's failure to record a notice of default and sale of trust deed deprived junior lienholder
of an opportunity to cure the default and holding that the so called Stephans rule was proper
measure of damages.); Rooz v. Kimmel, 55 Cal. App.4th 573, 593 (Cal. D. Ct. App. 1997)
(applying Stephans rule and finding that judgment against title company for failure to timely
record deed of trust which should have been in second position-but was recorded in fourth
position-was equal to the fair market value of the property at the time of the loss minus the
amount due on the prior recorded deeds of trust).
Each of these cases essentially treated the claim against the title company as a substitute
for the security that was lost as of the date of the allegedly wrongful conveyance. These cases
did not attempt to predict what would have happened to a second position deed of trust had it not
been extinguished and what "opportunity" may have been afforded an "underwater" second
position lien holder. The very essence of a "short sale" of the type EEF is claiming it lost the
right to participate in is that a first position lender holds all decision-making power. That lender
can choose or not choose to sell and at what price. It is sheer speculation to say that there is any
inherent "opportunity" in a second position at such sale, other than the "opportunity" to be
foreclosed out by senior lien holders. Indeed, had EEF still had an unconveyed interest and
therefore RBC could not cleanly sell its position, it is just as probably, if not more probable, that
RBC would have simply foreclosed out EEF. In this case, EEF's argument that it "might" have
purchased the Property and thereby gained some benefit by conducting prospective individual lot
sales is precisely the type of speculative damages that Idaho courts prohibit.
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In order to be entitled to any damages under the Stephans rule, EEF needed to offer
evidence that there was enough value in the Property at the time of the Reconveyance to fully
satisfy the RBC Loan. To date, the only evidence of value is that proffered by RBC in support of
its earlier filed (and now decided) motion for summarv iudQ111ent. The evidence introduced in
'

f

..,..,

V'

-----

the record by RBC shows that, in May of 2012, approximately two years after the Reconveyance,
RBC approved a short sale of the Property from Galiano to DAS for $773,559.22. At the time of
the short sale, Galiano owed RBC $3,260,656.14. Thus, if the Reconveyance had occurred in
2012, and the short sale price of $773,559.22 roughly approximated the fair market value of the
Property, EEF' s security interest, after deducting the amount RBC was owed under its note,
would have been worthless. This is the only evidence of the Property's value in the record and
EEF failed to offer competent evidence of its alleged damages in 2010. Accordingly, the district
court's dismissal of EEF's LC. § 45-1205 claim for failure to offer evidence of damages should
be affirmed by this Court.
C.

The District Court Properly Dismissed EEF's Tortious Interference with
Prospective Economic Advantage Claim because EEF Failed to Offer Competent
Evidence to Establish its Damages, if any, with Reasonable Certainty.

Similar to a LC. § 45-1205 claim, damages are a requisite element of a tortious
interference with prospective economic advantage claim, and EEF had to burden to establish
such damages with reasonable certainty to survive summary judgment. See Cantwell v. City of
Boise, 146 Idaho 127, 137-38, 191 P.3d 205, 215-16 (2008) (holding that a claim for intentional
interference with a prospective economic advantage has five elements, including "resulting
damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted"). The district court recognized the
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same, stating that a tortious interference with prospective economic advantage claim "requires
proof of damages resulting from the alleged interference." R. at 3057. Based on the fact that
both of EEF' s remaining claims against TitleOne required damage as a requisite element, the
district court provided a singular analysis of both claims in its Order Granting Summary
Judgment in favor of TitleOne. R. at 3057-61. As addressed above (supra § VI.B) the district
court properly concluded that EEF failed to offer proof of any damage with reasonable certainty
and dismissed this tortious interference claim. The district court's dismissal of EEF's tortious
interference with prospective economic advantage claim for failure to offer proof of damages
with reasonable certainty should be affirmed because the EEF failed to meet its burden on the
express elements of the claim. See Partout v. Harper, 145 Idaho 683,688, 183 P.3d 771, 776
(2008) ("The moving party is entitled to judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which
that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.").
If this Court concludes, like the district court, that EEF failed to meet its burden to offer

evidence of damages with reasonable certainty, the Court need not address any of the remaining
arguments in this Respondent's Brief. However, out of an abundance of caution and to address
all of the issues raised on appeal by EEF, TitleOne will continue to present argument and
authority supporting an affirmance of the district court's judgment.
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D.

Lack of Evidence of Intent to Interfere and Knowledge of the Expectancy Provide
Independent Grounds to Affirm the District Court's Dismissal of EEF's Tortious
Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage Claim.

In addition to being subject to dismissal for failure to offer competent evidence to
establish damages with reasonable certainty, EEF's tortious interference with prospective
economic advantage claim also fails on a lack of showing of two additional requisite elements of
the cause of action.
First, EEF had the burden to show that TitleOne directed its actions in some way toward
a third-party to "induc[e] termination of the expectancy." Cantwell, 146 Idaho at 138, 191 P.3d
at 216. It is well-established that a plaintiff cannot state a claim for tortious interference where
there is no evidence that a defendant made contact with or interfered with third-parties. 6
In the instant case, EEF has not alleged that TitleOne induced a third-party to not enter
into a contract, or otherwise terminate any relationship, with EEF. The gravamen of EEF' s
complaint is that TitleOne negligently reconveyed the EEF Deed of Trust. The reconveyance of
the EEF Deed of Trust occurred in isolation and did not involve third parties nor did it involve
See, e.g., Stofer v. First Nat'/ Bank, 571 N.E.2d 157, 167 (Ill. App Ct.. 1991) (interference with
business interests requires action by the defendant toward a third party which causes the third
party to breach a contractual relationship with the plaintiff); State Nat 'l Bank v. Academia, Inc.,
802 S.W.2d 282, 297 (Tex. App. 1990) (interpreting Illinois law and finding no tortious
interference where the defendant had made no direct contact with or interfered with relevant
third parties); K & K Mgmt. v. Lee, 557 A.2d 965, 973 (Md. 1989) (finding that tortious
interference with business relationships arises only out of the relationship between three partiesplaintiff, defendant, and the third party); Galinski v. Kessler, 480 N .E.2d 1176, 1180 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1985) (finding that tort of interference with plaintiffs prospective economic advantage
requires action by the defendant toward the third party); Teleflex Info. Sys, Inc. v. Arnold, 132
N.C. App. 689, 513 S.E.2d 85, 90 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that one of the elements of a
claim for tortious interference with a contract is that "the defendant intentionally induces the
third person not to perform the contract").
6
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TitleOne acting to divert or take business away from EEF. Because EEF has not alleged that
TitleOne induced a third party to terminate a relationship with EEF or that TitleOne induced a
third party not enter into a contract with EEF, EEF cannot satisfy the threshold "third-party
inducement" element to state a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic
advantage. Thus, the district court's dismissal should be affirmed.
Second, EEF had the burden to show that TitleOne had actual knowledge of EEF' s
expectancy. Cantwell, 146 Idaho at 138, 191 P.3d at 216. In the instant case, at the time of the
Reconveyance, TitleOne was operating on the belief that the statutory reconveyance process had
been satisfied and that EEF had been paid in full on the underlying note. Accordingly, TitleOne
at the time of the Reconveyance was of the belief that EEF had no further expectancy because its
economic interest in the property had been satisfied. Accordingly, TitleOne had no knowledge
of EEF's expectancy, and the second element of a claim for tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage claim cannot be satisfied by EEF.
In sum, even if EEF had offered the requisite evidence of damages-which it did notEEF' s tortious interference with prospective economic advantage claim still fails for lack of
evidence on two remaining requisite elements: (1) intentionally inducing termination of the
expectancy, and (2) knowledge of the expectancy on the part of the interferer. For these reasons,
the Court should affirm the district court's dismissal of EEF's tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage claim.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 19

E.

The District Court Correctly Held that the Three-Year Limitations Period from I.C.
§ 5-218(1) Applied to EEF's LC. § 45-1205 Claim and that the Cause of Action
Accrued on February 11, 2010.

To be clear, the district court's dismissal of EEF's Revised Second Amended Complaint
in no way relied on the fact that the statute oflimitations on EEF's LC. § 45-1205 claim had run.

See R. at 3062. The dismissal was based exclusively on EEF's failure to offer competent
evidence of damages. Accordingly, if the Court affirms the district court's grant of summary
judgment due to EEF's failure to meet its burden on damages, the Court need not take up the
statute of limitations issues raised by EEF on appeal. However, even if EEF had not failed to
offer cognizable proof of damages, its LC. § 45-1205 claim was barred by the statute of
limitations.
EEF's First Amended Complaint added an LC. § 45-1205 claim against TitleOne. R. at
581-82. TitleOne argued that the LC. § 45-1205 claim was time barred by the three-year
limitations period from LC. § 5-218(1). R. at 636-37. The district court agreed, holding that
EEF's LC. § 45-1205 claim was an action upon liability created by statute and that LC. § 5218(1) applied. R. at 1064. The district court then held that the limitation period began to run no
later than February 11, 2010 and that EEF initiated its case more than three years thereafter, on
June 5, 2013. R. at 1065. However, despite being time barred, the district court did not dismiss
EEF' s LC. § 45-1205 claim. R. at 1065-66. Instead, the district court granted EEF additional
time to establish that TitleOne was barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel from asserting
the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. R. at 1065-66. Unable to establish equitable
estoppel, EEF asked the district court to reconsider its ruling on the statute of limitations (R. at
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2734-36), which the district court denied as moot because the I.C. § 45-1205 claim was
ultimately dismissed on separate grounds. R. at 3062.
EEF argues that the district court erred in applying LC. § 5-218(1)'s three-year
limitations period and by holding that the accrual date was no later than February 11, 2010.
Appellant's Br. at 13-17. EEF argues that the district court erred in applying LC.§ 5-218(1) to
an LC. § 45-1205 claim because LC. § 45-1205 "is actually a codified tort, and tort law stands
independent of the existence of any statute."

Id. at 13.

EEF argues that the twenty-year

limitations period from LC. § 5-204 (claims arising from title to real property) should apply, or
alternatively, the four-year limitations period from LC. § 5-224 ( catchall limitations period). Id.
As to the date of accrual, EEF argues that its LC.§ 45-1205 claim accrued on May 12, 2012, the
date the Property was sold to DAS. Id. at 15.
i.

EEF's I.C. § 45-1205 Claim is Created by Statute and the Three-Year Statute
of Limitations Period from I.C. § 5-218(1) Applies.

The district court correctly described EEF's LC. § 45-1205 claim:
EEF alleges TitleOne is liable to EEF based on violating the provisions of Idaho
Code§ 45-1205. Thus, [the LC. § 45-1205 claim] plainly states "[a]n action upon
a liability created by statute." Although EEF may seek to establish a violation of
Idaho Code 45-1205 through a theory of negligence, whatever liability TitleOne
may incur would be due to violation of Idaho Code § 45-1205. Thus, the threeyear statute oflimitations under Idaho Code § 5-218(1) applies.
R. at 1064. The district court's reasoning is sound and should be affirmed. Indeed, EEF itself
appears to agree, stating in the discovery phase that "Idaho Code §45-1205 provides the statutory
basis for Plaintiff's negligence claim." R. at 819.
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"An action upon a liability created by statute" must be brought within three years. I.C. §

5-218(1) (emphasis added); Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 152 Idaho 495,497, 272 P.3d 467,
469 (2012) (holding that under I.C. § 5-218(1), a three-year statute of limitation applies to an
action upon a liability created by statute). Whether an action involves "a liability created by
statute" was directly addressed by this Court in City of Rexburg v. Madison County, 115 Idaho
88, 89, 764 P.2d 838, 838 (1988). There, the Court stated: "The phrase, 'a liability created by
statute,' means a liability which would not exist but for the statute." Id. (citing Dietrich v.
Copeland Lumber Co., 28 Idaho 312, 154 P. 626 (1916); 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions§

82 (1970); 54 C.J.S. Limitations ofActions§ 83 (1948)). To determine whether a statute creates
liability, the City of Rexburg Court focused on whether the applicable statute created a duty "not
based in common law, contract, or in any other theory oflaw." Id.
In this case, EEF's claim against TitleOne under I.C. § 45-1205 is squarely based upon "a
liability created by statute" and the district court's application of LC. § 5-218(1)'s three-year
limitations period was proper. Contrary to EEF's repeated statements, an action pursuant to I.C.
§ 45-1205 is not tantamount to a common law negligence action. Rather, it is a separate and
unique action that derives from a statutorily created duty. The starting point is the recognition
that deeds of trust themselves are creatures of statute, allowed and recognized under statutory
scheme, with only certain persons and entities being allowed to serve as trustees of deeds of
trust.

See e.g., I.C. § 45-1502(3) and 45-1502(4), § 45-1504.

The "forced reconveyance"

statutes further shape the purely statutory liability created under I.C. § 45-1501, et seq. by only
permitting "title agents" and "title insurers" to lawfully complete forced reconveyances and by
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providing express consequences to those persons if they fail to substantially comply with
statutory reconveyance procedures, act with negligence or act in bad faith. See e.g., LC. § 451201 (5) and (6), § 45-1202, and§ 45-1205.
More specifically, the statutory scheme of Chapters 12 and 15, Title 45, of the Idaho
Code establish a new statutory process for forced reconveyances. There is no common law
analog for the ability to make forced reconveyances and the corresponding liability created by
LC. § 45-1205. Chapter 12 of Title 45 is titled "reconveyance" and gives rights to title insurers
and title agents that do not exist under common law. For instance, under LC. § 45-1202, a title
insurer or title agent may reconvey a trust deed pursuant to the procedure prescribed in LC. § 451203, whether or not it is then named as trustee under the deed of trust. Compare with, LC. § 451514 (only permitting the named trustee to reconvey the deed of trust upon written request of the
named beneficiary). In this case, the Reconveyance by TitleOne pursuant to LC. § 45-1202 was
a "forced reconveyance," which is purely a creature of statute. Therefore, without LC. §§ 451202 and 1203 there would be no mechanism to achieve the forced reconveyance issued by
TitleOne in this case and which forms the basis of EEF's lawsuit. Likewise, Chapter 12 of Title
45 also provides a statutorily prescribed right to damages for a wrongful forced reconveyanceI.C. § 45-1205-the very statute that EEF claimed TitleOne violated.
EEF expressly pled a cause of action under LC. § 45-1205 in an attempt to make
TitleOne liable for an allegedly wrongful reconveyance. R. at 994. EEF also freely admitted
that LC. § 45-1205 provided the "statutory basis" for its negligence claim. R. at 819. Now, on
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appeal, for EEF to argue that its LC.§ 45-1205 claim did not seek to make TitleOne liable under
a statute is disingenuous.
Applying this Court's rule of law from City of Rexburg results in a conclusion that EEF' s
LC. § 45-1205 claim is a claim based upon liability created by statute and the three-year
limitations period from LC. § 5-218(1) applies.

To employ the phraseology of the City of

Rexburg Court, the liability EEF sought to establish on the part of TitleOne "would not exist but

for the statute." 115 Idaho at 89, 764 P.2d at 839. In fact, as addressed above, deeds of trust
would not exist, nor would forced reconveyances be permitted, without statutory authority.
Idaho Code § 45-1205, and Chapter 12 of Title 45 generally, create a duty that is not based in
common law, contract, or in any other theory oflaw. Accordingly, a claim for a violation of I.C.
§ 45-1205 is based upon liability created by statute and the three-year limitations period applies. 7
ii.

The Date of Accrual is the Date of the Alleged Wrongful Reconveyance.

The district court held that EEF' s LC. § 45-1205 claims "accrued and the statute of
limitations began to run no later than February 11, 2010, at which point the reconveyance had
been signed and recorded." R. at 1065. The district court settled on February 11, 2010 because
this was the date that EEF would have been permitted to maintain a lawsuit against TitleOne
predicated on LC.§ 45-1205. R. at 1064.
7

The fact that the title agent or title insurer is made expressly "liable" for "damages suffered"
under LC. § 45-1205 refutes EEF's argument that the four-year "catch all" limitations period
from of LC. § 5-224 is applicable. Idaho Code § 5-224 begins by saying "[an] action for relief
not hereinbefore provided for must be commenced . . . . " However, LC. § 5-218(1) is very
specific in proving a statute of limitations for actions upon liability created by statute, such as
actions pursuant to LC. § 45-1205. Therefore, the four-year limitations period from LC. § 5-224
is not applicable to EEF's LC. § 45-1205 claim.
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EEF argues that the district court erred in holding that the accrual date was February 11,
2010. EEF argues that the district court's holding is "patently unfair" because the limitations
period ran on its LC. § 45-1205 claim prior to discovering the Reconveyance. Appellant's Br. at
14. EEF also argues that February 11, 2010 is an improper accrual date because it was not until
May 12, 2012, the date that Galiano sold the Property to DAS, that EEF allegedly suffered
damage from the Reconveyance. Id. at 14-15.
This Court has held that there is no discovery rule exception associated with LC. § 5218(1) and that the cause of action accrues when "some damage" is suffered. Knudsen v. Agee
Title, 128 Idaho 776, 778-79, 918 P.2d 1221, 1223-24 (1996). In Knudsen, for instance, the
statutorily created liability was alleged to be liability under a wire tapping statute. The court
there held that some damage accrued when the original wire tap was made, saying: "Based upon
our determination that in the case of wiretapping the damage is immediate, we hold that the
statute of limitations begins to run no later than the last day of wiretapping." Id. The import of
Knudsen, that damage in that type of situation is immediate, is entirely consistent with the
previously cited case of Stephans v. Herman, and the so called "Stephans Rule" espoused therein
that the loss for wrongful reconveyance of a deed of trust is measured "as of the date of
conversion." Id.
Here, it is undisputed that the reconveyance of the EEF Deed of Trust was executed by
TitleOne employees on January 25, 2010, and recorded in the real property records of Ada
County, Idaho on February 11, 2010. R. at 691. This was the vehicle by which EEF's deed of
trust disappeared from the public record, stripping EEF of its rights as a lien holder and causing
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some damage to EEF at that point in time. 8 The Complaint in this matter was filed June 5, 2013,
more than three years after the date of recording of the allegedly improper reconveyance on
February 11, 2010. Accordingly, I.C. § 5-218(1) bars the filing of a cause of action under LC.§
45-1205 and the district court's holding stating the same should be affirmed. 9
iii.

The Twenty-Year Adverse Possession Limitations Period is Inapplicable.

Within Title 5, Chapter 2, of the Idaho Code many limitations periods have been
codified. Idaho Code § 5-204 provides:
No cause of action ... arising out of the title to real property, or to rents or profits
out of the same, can be effectual unless it appears that the person prosecuting the
action ... or under whose title the action is prosecuted ... was seized or possessed
of the premises in question within twenty (20) years before the commencement of
the act in respect to which such action is prosecuted or defense made.
I.C. § 5-204 (emphasis added).
EEF seizes on the phrase "arising out of title to real property" to argue that its claims
arising out of the Reconveyance have a twenty-year limitations period because the
Reconveyance effected the title of the Property. Appellant's Br. at 18. EEF's argument lacks
merit for the following reasons.
First, the plain language of I.C. § 5-204 establishes that the provision is not applicable
under the facts of this case. For LC. § 5-204's twenty-year limitations period to apply, "the

8

Footnote 24 in TitleOne's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, R. at
63 7, is hereby incorporated by reference and restated as if set forth in full.
9 TitleOne also notes that the forced reconveyance statute provides for mailed notice of intent to
reconvey 60 days in advance of any such reconveyance (I.C. § 45-1203(3)), and that the
evidence in the record is that this notice was mailed to EEF at its address on or around October
12, 2009, via certified mail, return receipt requested. R. at 691, 1768, and 1769.
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person prosecuting the action," EEF in this case, must have been "seized or possessed of the"
Property within twenty years before the commencement of this action. However, EEF was never
"seized or possessed of the" Property at any time.
As used in LC. § 5-204 "seized" is synonymous with "seisin" and requires that the party
relying on LC. § 5-204 be the "holder of the legal title." Dickerson v. Brewster, 88 Idaho 330,
336, 399 P.2d 407, 410 (1965); see also Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining
"seisin" as "[p ]ossession of a freehold estate in land; ownership"). The Dickerson Court
elaborated that the requirement of seisin or possession under LC. § 5-204 "is met when it is
established that the plaintiff was possessed of legal title ... " Id. (quoting Smith v. Long, 76 Idaho
265, 277, 281 P.2d 483, 491 (1955). "Possession" as used in I.C. § 5-204 requires "actual,
exclusive, open, and adverse possession of the premises." Fountain v. Lewiston Nat. Bank, l l
Idaho 451, 83 P. 505, 511 (1905); see also Hazard v. Cole, l Idaho 276, 285 (1869) (generally
defining "possession" in the legal context as "the having, holding, or detention of property in
one's power or command; actual seisin or occupancy; ownership, whether rightful or wrongful").
In this case, EEF has not even alleged that that it was seized or possessed of the Property,
this alone should defeat any argument that the twenty-year limitations period of LC. § 5-204
should be applied. See Ryan v. Woodin, 9 Idaho 525, 75 P. 261, 262 (1904) (barring an action
under LC. § 5-204's predecessor, Section 4037, where no allegation of seisen or possession was
made). Notwithstanding, EEF's failure to allege seisen or possession, the facts clearly establish
that EEF was neither seized nor possessed of the Property. EEF was not the titled owner and at
no time held actual possession of the Property. EEF' s status as second position beneficiary of a
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deed of trust in the Property is not sufficient to establish seisen or possession because it had no
present rights or interest in the Property as a beneficiary. See e.g., Berryhill v. Moore, 180 Ariz.
77, 88, 881 P .2d 1182, 1193 (App. 1994) (holding that Arizona's statute on adverse possession
had language that "implies that only a person with a present right to recover land from an
adverse possessor is required to begin an action to do so within the ten-year period").
Accordingly, because EEF, as a beneficiary of a non-foreclosed deed of trust, was never "seized
or possessed of the premises" at any time I.C. § 5-204 by its plain terms is not applicable.
Second, the overall structure of Chapter 2, Title 5 clearly establishes that LC. § 5-204 is
designed to create limitations periods for the recovery of real property, not the pursuit of a
statutory negligence claim and money damages. Chapter 2, Title 5, titled "Limitation of
Actions," is divided into two general sections: (1) actions to recover real property, 10 LC. §§ 5203 to 213; and (2) actions other than for the recovery ofreal property, LC. §§ 5-214 to 226.
Statutory "[p ]rovisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in the
context of the entire document. The statute should be considered as a whole, and words should
be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings." State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863, 866, 264
P .3d 970, 973 (2011) (citation omitted).
Chapter 2, Title 5's structure is significant and establishes that LC. § 5-204's twenty-year
limitations period does not apply to an LC. § 45-1205 claim simply because the claim
tangentially arises out of title to real property as EEF claims. Based on the above, EEF is indeed

10

Including actions to recover "issues and profits [of real property] or "to rents and profits
[arising] out of [the title to real property]." I.C. Sections 5-202 and§ 5-204.
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trying to drive a square peg into a round hole when it claims that its "45-1205 negligence claim"
is the type of claim that is contemplated by 5-204's reference to "arising out of the title to real
property." Idaho Code § 45-1205 does not provide for a reinstatement of the deed of trust or
recovery of the property; instead it only provides for damages when a deed of trust is negligently
reconveyed. 11 As an action for money damages, it certainly would seem to be an action "other

than for the recovery of real property," and accordingly found in Chapter 2 following after I.C.
§ 5-214, not before it. LC. § 5-214 (emphasis added). Because LC. § 5-204 plainly applies to

the recovery of real property this Court should affirm the district court's application of LC. § 5218(1) limitations period to EEF's claim for recovery ofdamages under LC.§ 45-1205.
Third, since enactment, LC. § 5-204 and its companion statutes LC. §§ 5-202 to 5-213
have been employed nearly exclusively in the context of adverse possession. 12 For instance, in

Sa/vis, the Court cited to LC. §§ 5-203, 5-204, 5-206, and 5-210 as all working together with
respect to the adverse possession claims in that case. 73 Idaho at 471-72, 253 P.2d at 590.

TitleOne would note that a separate provision, LC. Section 45-1203, provides only in very
limited circumstances of forgery of the title insurer or title agent's signature that the forced
reconveyance deed "shall constitute a reconveyance of the trust deed identified therein,
irrespective of any deficiency in their reconveyance procedure not disclosed in the release or
reconveyance that is recorded ... ". LC. § 45-1203(4).
12 See, e.g., Ryan v. Woodin, 9 Idaho 525, 75 P. 261 (1904) (adverse possession); Canady v.
Coeur d'Alene Lumber Co., 21 Idaho 77, 120 P. 830 (1911) (claim barred based on statute of
limitations against lumber mill who had occupied vacated city property for more than five (now
20) years); Last Chance Ditch Co. v. Sa11J!er, 35 Idaho 61, 204 P. 654 (1922) ("adverse use");
Pleasants v. Henry, 36 Idaho 728,213 P. 565 (1923) (adverse possession); Chapin v. Stewart, 71
Idaho 306, 230 P.2d 998 (1951) (adverse possession); Sa/vis v. Lawyer, 73 Idaho 469, 253 P.2d
589 (1951) (adverse possession); Obermeyer v. Idohl, 76 Idaho 103, 278 P.2d 188 (1954)
(adverse possession); and Dickerson v. Brewster, 88 Idaho 330, 399 P.2d 407 (1965) (adverse
possession).
11
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Based on this Court's historic application of I.C. § 5-204 and its companion statutes to adverse
possession cases, it is no surprise that when the Idaho Legislature amended LC. § 5-204 and its
companion statutes in 2006 by changing the limitations period from five years to twenty years it
stated: "This amendment to existing Code extends the time required to adversely possess real
property from five (5) years to twenty (20) years.

2006 Idaho Laws ch. 158 (S.B. 1311)

(emphasis added). Based on this, it is reasonable to infer that the Legislature intends for LC. § 5204 to apply to adverse possession claims in precisely the same way as this Court has interpreted
it for over a hundred years, as relating to adverse possession issues. For these reasons, the Court
should affirm the district court's application of I.C. §LC.§ 5-218(1) limitations period to EEF's
I.C. § 45-1205 claim.

F.

The District Court's Dismissal of EEF's Common Law Negligence Claim was
Proper because EEF Conceded that the Claim was Barred by the Economic Loss
Doctrine.
Below, TitleOne argued that EEF's common law negligence claim should be dismissed

because it was barred by the economic loss doctrine.

R. at 107-10.

EEF conceded that

TitleOne's argument may be correct but argued that despite dismissal of the common law
negligence claim, EEF could still pursue a separate statutory negligence claim predicated on I.C.
§ 45-1205.

R. at 194. 13

Specifically, EEF stated: "unlike common law economic loss in

negligence, Idaho statutory law enables recovery for the negligent improper reconveyance of a
trust deed." Id. On that basis, EEF amended its complaint "to include a separate claim under
13

EEF stated: "Although the Defendant TitleOne may be correct when they [sic] spent 3Y:z pages
discussing economic loss theory, they completely ignore the statutory remedy under Idaho Code
§ 45-1205." R. at 194.
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§ 45-1205".

R. at 209.

Thereafter, the district court dismissed EEF's common law

negligence claim because EEF conceded that the economic loss doctrine applied and did not
argue that any exceptions to the economic loss doctrine applied. R. at 535.
EEF now argues that the district court erred in dismissing its common law negligence
claim. Appellant's Br. at 19. First, EEF argues that this case involves the negligent rendition of
services as opposed to the provision of a negligent product making the economic loss doctrine
inapplicable. Id. at 19-21.

Second, EEF argues that even if the economic loss doctrine is

applicable, the "special relationship" exception to the economic loss rule applies because "a
special relationship exists between title companies and any holder of a deed of trust." Id. at 2223. EEF' s arguments lack merit and should not even be addressed by the Court because EEF has
waived them or is judicially estopped from doing so.
i.

EEF Conceded that the Economic Loss Rule Applied to Bar Its Common
Law Negligence Claim and thereby Waived that Claim or is Judicially
Estopped from Asserting It.

EEF knowingly and voluntarily conceded the soundness of TitleOne's argument that the
economic loss doctrine barred EEF' s common law negligence claim. EEF' s briefing to the
district court stated:
Although the Defendant TitleOne may be correct when they [sic] spent 3 V2 pages
discussing economic loss theory, they completely ignored the statutory remedy
under Idaho Code § 45-1205. Because the statute requires, among other things,
negligence in a reconveyance to trigger liability for damages, the Plaintiffs' claim
for negligence must remain. In other words, unlike common law economic loss in
negligence, Idaho statutory law enables recovery for the negligent improper
reconveyance of a trust deed.
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at 194 (emphasis added). 14
Based on EEF' s above statements, the district court dismissed EEF' s common law
negligence count, stating: "Plaintiffs concede the economic loss doctrine bars its negligence
claim unless that claim is brought under Idaho Code § 45-1205." R. at 535. In conceding the
issue below and not presenting any argument to rebut TitleOne's position that the economic loss
doctrine barred EEF' s common law negligence claim, EEF has waived any argument to the
contrary on appeal, or alternatively is judicially estopped against pursuing it.
Waiver is the "[t]he intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right." Frontier

Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Douglass, 123 Idaho 808, 816, 853 P.2d 553, 561 (1993). Waiver is
distinguishable from judicial estoppel.

Id.

"Judicial estoppel precludes a party from

advantageously taking one position, then subsequently seeking a second position that is
incompatible with the first." Hoagland v. Ada Cty., 154 Idaho 900, 912, 303 P.3d 587, 599
(2013) (citation omitted) (applying judicial estoppel in an appeal to bar appellant from arguing
that she was entitled to recover under a theory she informed the district court that she was not
seeking recovery under). 15 "Substantive issues will not be considered the first time on appeal."

See also R. 819 wherein EEF says: "Idaho Code §45-1205 provides the statutory basis for
Plaintiffs negligence claim. Additionally, Plaintiff believes that common law negligence does
apply and intents [sic "intends"] on moving the court for leave to amend its complaint to further
clarify what Plaintiff believe are exceptions to the economic loss rule." (Emphasis added.)
15 TitleOne also notes and incorporates from the record on appeal as argument on this appeal that
it had argued unsuccessfully to the district court that I.C. § 45-1201, et seq. provides the
exclusive remedy for negligent reconveyance. R. at 916, 936, and 950. This argument, if
accepted, would provide an independent ground to uphold the district court's decisions to
dismiss the common law negligence count and not to allow that argument back in by way of a
14
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Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 512, 181 P.3d 435, 438 (2007). Therefore, "[a] litigant
may not remain silent as to claimed error during a trial and later urge his objections thereto for
the first time on appeal." Hoppe v. McDonald, 103 Idaho 33, 35,644 P.2d 355,357 (1982).
In this case, EEF voluntarily relinquished its right to pursue a common negligence claim
against TitleOne by conceding that the claim was barred by the economic loss doctrine. The
record establishes that EEF voluntarily and knowingly stated that TitleOne's arguments with
respect to the economic loss doctrine were likely correct and did not correct the district court's
conclusion that EFF conceded the issue. This amounts to waiver of the claim. In addition,
EEF's briefing and argument before the district court appears to establish that EEF was only
seeking to recover on TitleOne's alleged negligence under LC. § 45-1205, thereby implicitly
abandoning its argument on common law negligence claim and representing to the district court
that the case was moving forward solely on the duty created by LC. § 45-1205. This Court
should not permit to EEF to now change its position on appeal and assert that its common law
negligence claims was improperly denied.
Lastly, as a practical matter, EEF's common law negligence claim was not actually
litigated below; instead, it was essentially voluntarily dismissed.

Thus, EEF should not be

permitted to raise the issue now on appeal because the district court did not rule on the merits of
EEF's common law negligence claim or TitleOne's defenses thereon, namely the application of

later amendment. TitleOne has listed exclusivity of the forced reconveyance statutes as an
additional issue in this appeal.
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the economic loss doctrine. For these reasons, this Court should not address any of EFF's
argument on appeal that the district court erred in applying the economic loss doctrine.
ii.

The Economic Loss Rule Applies to Damages for Loss of Equity or Security.

In Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P .2d 784 (1978), the court
adopted the following summary by Dean Prosser regarding the economic loss rule:
Certain types of interests, because of the various difficulties which they present,
have been afforded relatively little protection at the hands of the law against
negligent invasions. Thus interests of a pecuniary nature, such as the right to have
a contract performed, the expectation offinancial advantage, or the integrity of
the pocketbook which may be damaged by reliance upon a representation, all
present special problems . . . . In general, however, it may be said that the law
gives protection against negligent acts to the interest in security of the person, and
all interests in tangible property. In other words, negligence may result in liability
for personal injury or property damage.
99 Idaho at 469, 583 P.2d 1004 (emphasis added). 16 Courts have held that a claimed loss of
equity is indeed an economic loss and dismissed common law negligence claims on this basis.

See e.g., Schaefer v. Indymac Mortgage Services, 2012 WL 4929094, at *1-2 (D.N.H. October
16, 2012)(claim that loss of home of 28 years and any equity therein to wrongful foreclosure "is
economic--the loss of his property and the equity he held in his property."); First Internet Bank

of Indiana v. Lawyers Title Insurance Co., 2009 WL 2092782, at *1 (S.D. Ind. July 13,
2009)(where claim was improper execution of escrow instructions prevented lender from being

Accord Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Sys., Inc., 147 Idaho 785, 790, 215 P.3d 505, 510 (2009)
("Generally, a plaintiff may not recover in tort where the sole allegation is that the defendant
prevented the plaintiff from gaining a purely economic advantage.") (citing Just's, Inc. v.
Arrington Const. Co., Inc., 99 Idaho 462, 468, 583 P.2d 997, 1003 (1978)) and ("Economic loss
has been defined as, but not limited to, ... commercial loss for inadequate value and consequent
loss of profits or use.") Id. (quoting Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft
Co., 97 Idaho 348,351,544 P.2d 306,309 (1975) (rev'd on other grounds)).
16
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first position and thereby damaged its equity, "[t]he improper loan closing damaged the
security interest, but this damage falls squarely within the economic loss doctrine, is covered by
the contract, and is not recoverable in a tort action.").
iii.

No Exceptions to the Economic Loss Rule Were Argued Below and Thus
May Not be Raised on Appeal.

The district court noted that "neither party has discussed or argued any of the exceptions
to the economic loss rule." R. at 535. "Issues not raised below and presented for the first time
on appeal will not be considered for review." Frontier Dev. Grp., LLC v. Caravella, 157 Idaho
589,595,338 P.3d 1193, 1199 (2014) (citations omitted). However, even if the issue of special
exceptions to the rule is reachable on appeal-which it is not-then this argument fails as well.
The "special relationship" exception generally pertains to claims for personal services
provided by professionals, such as physicians, attorneys, architects, engineers, and insurance
agents. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 408, 848 P.2d 984, 992 (Ct.App. 1992). A special
relationship may exist where a party holds itself out to the public as performing a specialized
function and induces reliance on superior knowledge and skill.

Duffin v. Idaho Crop

Improvement Assn., 126 Idaho 1002, 1008, 895 P.2d 1195, 1201 (1995). A statutory trustee is
different from those parties, in that such a person or entity's entire relationship is defined by
statutes and precisely what duties they agree to assume and is not fiduciary in nature. As U.S.
District Judge Lynn B. Winmill stated:
Under Idaho law, the duties of a trustee on a deed trust have only been recognized
as those specified under either in the Idaho Trust Deeds Act or in the deed of trust
document itself. See Davis v. Keybank Nat'[ Assoc., 2005 WL 2847239, 2-3 & n.
5 (D. Idaho October 26, 2005) (Construing deed of trust trustee's duty under the
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Deeds Trust Act, and noting that Idaho courts had not determined duty to be
fiduciary in nature.); Diamond v. Sandpoint Title Ins., Inc., 132 Idaho 145, 968
P.2d 240, 246 (Idaho 1998) (Noting that the Idaho courts have not recognized that
the duties of a trustee under a deed of trust are fiduciary in nature.).
Sykes v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Sys., Inc., 2012 WL 914922, *4 (D. Idaho 2012).
With respect to the forced reconveyance of a deed of trust, the Legislature has granted
title insurers and title agents, who are not even the trustee listed in the deed of trust at issue, the
power to reconvey. Such individuals likely have never even met, communicated with, or had
any interaction with the beneficiaries of those deeds of trust being reconveyed. Additionally,
such individuals are acting solely based on statutory authority and are not even the trustee named
in the deed of trust at issue. Accordingly, the close, special relationship from which a duty can
arise to create an exception to the economic loss doctrine is simply not present in the statutorily
created and defined forced reconveyance context. EEF's proposal that "a special relationship
exists between title companies and any holder of a deed of trust" would create an exception
without any relationship, thereby eviscerating the special relationship exception.
G.

TitleOne is Entitled to its Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal.
For the reasons discussed above, TitleOne is the prevailing party in this appeal and is

entitled to costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and attorney fees pursuant to LC. §§ 12-121 and 120(3).
i.

TitleOne is Entitled to its Fees on Appeal Under I.C. § 12-121 Because EEF
Pursued this Appeal Frivolously, Unreasonably, or Without Foundation.

Reasonable attorney fees may be awarded to the prevailing party pursuant to LC. § 12121. Teurlings v. Larson, 156 Idaho 65, 75, 320 P.3d 1224, 1234 (2014). An "award of attorney
fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121 is not a matter of right to the prevailing party, but is appropriate
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only when the court, in its discretion, is left with the abiding belief that the case was brought,
pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Id. at 75-76, 320 P.3d
at 1234-35 (citation omitted). "Idaho Code section 12-121 permits a court to apportion and
award reasonable attorney fees for claims that are brought or defended unreasonably, frivolously,
or without adequate foundation in fact or law." Baird-Sallaz v. Sallaz, 157 Idaho 342, 347, 336
P.3d 275, 280 (2014) (citation omitted). An appeal from a well reasoned decision of a district
court without adding any new analysis of or authority to the issues raised below may be frivolous
and unreasonable. See Castrigno v. McQuade, 141 Idaho 93, 98, 106 P.3d 419,424 (2005).
In this case, failure to offer competent evidence of damages is the only basis upon which
EEF's remaining claims against TitleOne were dismissed. R. at 3061. This should not have
been a surprise to EEF, who throughout the underlying case ignored its burden to establish
damages. EEF even ignored its burden after an express reminder from the district court that it
was neglecting its burden to offer evidence of damages. See Supra p. 13 17 (establishing that the
district court warned EEF of its need to offer evidence of damages, and EEF willfully refusing to
do so because any attempt would be speculative).
Thus, despite knowingly failing to meet its burden on a requisite element of its claims,
EEF still unsuccessfully pursued claims against TitleOne. R. at 3052-53. Now, with no new
evidence, EEF has appealed to this Court arguing that it sufficiently met its burden to establish

17

Tr. at 248 (court indicating to defense counsel in setting expert disclosure deadline "I think it
would seem to be significant to try and sort out what kind of damages are claimed and are at
stake and whether they're recoverable and all of that.").
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damages with reasonable certainly below (Appellant's Br. p. 8-12), yet EEF conceded below
that establishing damages would be only speculation and was not possible.
Pursuit of this appeal with no new evidence or arguments related to damages, after the
district court warned EEF of that it was not meeting its burden to offer evidence of damages, is
frivolous and unreasonable. Furthermore, the bulk ofEEF's appeal argues non-dispositive issues;
namely the applicable statute of limitations (a frivolous argument in light of one hundred years
of contrary authority on LC. § 5-204) and the application of the economic loss doctrine (which is
not ripe for appeal and was conceded by EEF below). For these reasons, an award of costs and
attorney fees on appeal is proper under LC.§ 12-121.
ii.

TitleOne is Entitled to Its Fees on Appeal Under I.C. § 12-120(3) because
This Case Arises From a Commercial Transaction That is the Gravamen of
EEF' s Lawsuit.

"Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) provides for attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil
action to recover on 'any commercial transaction.' Commercial transactions are all transactions
except for personal or household purposes." De Groot v. Standley Trenching, Inc., 157 Idaho
557, 566-67, 338 P.3d 536, 546 (2014). Where a commercial transaction is the "gravamen of
the lawsuit," I.C. § 12-120(3) "compels" an award of attorney fees and costs. See e.g. Edged In
Stone, Inc. v. Nw. Power Sys., LLC, 156 Idaho 176, 181, 321 P.3d 726, 731 (2014).

A

commercial transaction is the gravamen "in any civil action arising from a commercial
transaction ...." Frontier Dev. Grp., LLC v. Caravella, 157 Idaho 589, 599, 338 P.3d 1193,
1203 (2014); see also Goodman Oil Co. v. Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 148 Idaho 588,
592, 226 P .3d 530, 534 (2010).
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"Idaho Code § 12-120(3) does not require that there be a

contract between the parties before the statute is applied; the statute only requires that there be a
commercial transaction." In re Univ. Place/Idaho Water Ctr. Project, 146 Idaho 527, 541, 199
P.3d 102, 116 (2008). In Goodman, the Court equated the gravamen issue to a "but for cause"
analysis stating that without the underlying commercial transaction, "the lawsuit would not have
been brought." 148 Idaho at 592, 226 P.3d at 534. The Goodman decision is supported by the
oft-cited Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., which held "as long as a commercial transaction is at the
center of the lawsuit, the prevailing party may be entitled to attorney fees for claims that are
fundamentally related to the commercial transaction.... " 152 Idaho 741, 756, 274 P.3d 1256,
1271 (2012).
In this case, TitleOne is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3) because
TitleOne is the prevailing party in this litigation and EEF's claims in this lawsuit arise out of a
commercial transaction and such commercial transaction is the gravamen of this lawsuit. At the
heart of this lawsuit are the EEF Loan and EEF Deed of Trust, which were executed as part of a
series of transactions for the commercial development of consumer dwellings. The EEF Loan
and EEF Deed of Trust transactions were by definition commercial transactions. See I.C. § 12120(3). Because this case arises from a commercial transaction, TitleOne, as the prevailing
party, is entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 12-120(3).
VI.

CONCLUSION

Therefore, primarily on the basis that no recognizable basis for a claim of damage ever
existed in this case, TitleOne respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
decisions in this case with respect to TitleOne, including the dismissal of claims against TitleOne
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granting of summary judgment in favor of TitleOne, and the associated award of attorneys
fees. TitleOne further requests an award of its cost and attorneys fees on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of December, 2015.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

Thomas E. Dvorak
Counsel for Respondent TitleOne Corporation

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 40

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 23 1d day of December, 2015, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to the persons listed below the method indicated:

David M. Fogg
Aaron Tribble
D. Von Johnson
Eagle Law Center
1191 E. Iron Eagle Drive, Ste. 200
Eagle, ID 83616
Counsel for Appellant Eagle Equity Fund, LLC

Hand Delivery
X Facsimile: 938-9504
Overnight Courier
~U.S.Mail

David T. Krueck
Greener Burke Shoemaker Oberrecht PA
960 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, ID 83702
Counsel for Respondent Corey Barton Homes, Inc.

_

_

_

Hand Delivery
319-2601
Overnight Courier
U.S. Mail

X Facsimile:

Thomas E. Dvorak

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF- 41

